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Abstract. We propose a disk encryption method, called secure disk
mixed system (SDMS) in this paper, for data protection of disk storages
such as USB flash memory, USB hard disk and CD/DVD. It is aimed to
solve temporal and spatial limitation problems of existing disk encryption
methods and to control security performance flexibly according to the
security requirement of system. SDMS stores data by encrypting with
different encryption key per sector and updates sector encryption keys
each time data is written. Security performance of SDMS is analyzed at
the end of the paper.
1 Introduction
Massive use of mobile storage media raises data security problem seriously. Data
security of mobile storage media can be realized in different ways, e.g., file unit
encryption, file system level encryption, and full disk encryption [1, 3, 4, 5,
6]. Reliability of security system should not be based on system mechanism
or complexity of system analysis, and it should guarantee safety even if system
mechanism or encryption algorithm is opened to third party. We analyze security
problems of existing disk encryption methods in the next section and describe
our disk encryption method based on SDMS in the following section. In the last
section, we analyze security performance of our system.
2 Previous Works
Several different methods for disk encryption, such as LoopAES, EFS, True-
Crypt, NCryptfs, were suggested [4, 5, 9, 10, 11]. In these methods, encryption
of disk block is expressed as follows.
C = OP (BE(OP (P,DEK, i), DEK), DEK, i)
Here, BE is block encryption function (AES, 3DES, etc), OP is operation
function (CBC, LRW, XTS, etc), DEK is disk encryption key, C is ciphertext, P
is plaintext and i is block index. As above expression shows, these disk encryp-
tion systems encrypt plaintext using symmetric-key algorithm through certain
operation and apply this operation again to encrypted result. [7] and [8] explain
BitLocker disk encryption method and its security strength, which is offered in
Windows Vista. Here, plaintext is XORed with sector key, passed two diffusers
ar
X
iv
:1
21
2.
20
54
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
0 D
ec
 20
12
2 Dokjun An, Myongchol Ri, Changil Choe, Sunam Han, and Yongmin Kim
in succession, and finally encrypted using AES of CBC mode. These disk encryp-
tion methods have some weakness in terms of time passage and space expansion.
We call it temporal limitation and spatial limitation, respectively, in this paper.
– Temporal limitation
If third party succeed to detect encryption key of a certain sector, data which
is stored later in this sector can be decoded.
– Spatial limitation
If third party succeed to detect encryption key of a certain block, whole data
of disk is in danger of being decoded.
GBDE based encryption method which was implemented in FreeBSD over-
came these temporal and spatial limitations to a certain extent [6]. In this
method, data is stored in sector by being encrypted with different key each time
data is writen, because it generates random data newly and encrypt plaintext
using it. Therefore, it is impossible to decrypt data stored newly even though
third party succeeds to detect key by attacking a sector. And each key encrypt-
ing plaintext sectors are different each other when it writes data on disk, because
GBDE encrypts plaintext using randomly generated key. Thus, it is impossible
to decrypt data of other block even if third party detects encryption key by at-
tacking a data sector. Although GBDE based disk encryption method overcomes
temporal and spatial limitations of previous disk encryption methods consider-
ably, it still has some security problems to be solved.
At first, key-key for a given sector is fixed because it is decided depending on
the sector address. That is, when it was writen new data on sector, sector key is
encrypted by same key-key. Then, if attacker detect 128bit sector key by attack-
ing AES/CBC/128 encrypted plaintext data and detect key-key subsequently by
attacking AES/CBC/256 encrypted sector key, it is possible to decrypt newly
stored data on this sector. We think this is temporal limitation of GBDE based
disk encryption.
Next, it is easy to get keychain used to encrypt plaintext data, if the cor-
relation between random data generated consecutively by PRNG is revealed,
because it directly uses random data generated by PRNG as key for plaintext.
However, strictly speaking, PRNG generates data deterministically based on the
initial value. If attacker succeeds to get sector key by attacking key sector and
subsequently succeeds to know inner state of PRNG, he can detect following
sector keys easily. This allows possibility of decrypting consecutive ciphers by
attacking one sector. Of course, it is possible to make difficult to predict future
data from past data using cryptographically secure PRNG, but it causes another
security problem that safety of system depends on the safety of PRNG too much.
We think this is spatial limitation of GBDE based disk encryption. In the next
section, we present a new disk encryption method based on the SDMS.
3 SDMS-Based Disk Encryption
In section 2, we discussed temporal and spatial limitations of previous works
for disk encryption and concluded that GBDE still has security problem to be
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solved, while it is a good disk encryption method. In this section, we propose
SDMS (secure disk mixed system) aimed to solve temporal and spatial limitation
of existing disk encryption methods and to control security performance flexibly
according to the security requirement of system.
3.1 SDMS
SDMS is a method to encrypt each sector by generating sector key using ran-
domly generated SEED and disk encryption key DEK. In our method, encryption
key of each sector is different each other and it is changed whenever encryption
is done.
Data Structure SDMS manages data area of media by dividing into SDMS
blocks. Each block consists of SDMS BLOCK DA area storing encrypted data
and SDMS BLOCK SA area storing random numbers which are used to generate
encryptioin key for the encryption of SDMS BLOCK DA area.
SDMS BLOCK SA area consists of SDMS UNIT SEEDs which are SEED
data for each sector. Fig. 1 shows data structure of SDMS. Size of each area is
determined depeding on the size of random data SDMS UNIT SEED needed to
generate sector key.
SIZE(SDMS BLOCK DA) =
SIZE(SDMS BLOCK SA)/SIZE(SDMS UNIT SEED)× 512
If we store SDMS BLOCK SA in one sector, the number of sector of SDMS
BLOCK DA is equal to 512 / SIZE(SDMS UNIT SEED). For example, if we
set SIZE(SDMS UNIT SEED) = 8 byte (128 bit), then the number of sec-
tors of SDMS BLOCK DA is equal to 512 × 8/128 = 64. That is, 64 plain-
text sectors constitute a SDMS block (SDMS BLOCK) and one SEED sector
(SDMS BLOCK SA) is in this block.
There is no constraint that SDMS BLOCK SA must be one sector in SDMS
block. System designer can adjust this setting freely according to the security
requirement and this setting will change processing of blocks of SDMS.
Data Encryption Encryption mode of SDMS is expressed as follows.
C = EA(P,RTEK)
Here, EA is encryption function, RTEK is encryption key, C is cipher, and P
is plaintext. RTEK is determined on the fly in time of real-time encryption (or
decryption) as follows.
RTEK = DK Func(DEK,SEED, i)
Here, DEK is disk encryption key, SEED is random data in SDMS UNIT SEED
area, i is sector index and DK Func is key derivation function. DK Func is a
4 Dokjun An, Myongchol Ri, Changil Choe, Sunam Han, and Yongmin Kim
Fig. 1. Data structure of SDMS
function to derive real-time encryption key from disk encryption key, SEED and
sector index. It is a one-way function where the length of output is constantly the
same as the length of RTEK. Encryption and decryption algorithms of SDMS
are as follows.
– Encryption
• Writing request for i-th sector
• Random generation of SEED
• Calculation of RTEK
• Encryption of plaintext with RTEK
• Writing cipher on SDMS BLOCK DA
• Writing SEED on SDMS BLOCK SA
– Decryption
• Reading request for i-th sector
• Getting SEED from SDMS BLOCK SA
• Reading cipher from SDMS BLOCK SA
• Calculation of RTEK
• Decryption of cipher with RTEK
3.2 DEK Management
DEK is generated when disk is initialized and is used to encrypt whole data
of disk. If DEK is revealed, attacker can decrypt whole data of disk. DEK can
be stored in the same disk with plaintext or in physically separated memory
device such as USB memory or file server of high security level. No matter it
is stored in data disk or physically isolated memory device, DEK must be en-
crypted based on the user authentication information. User can be authenticated
through PKCS#5 based password authentication or PKCS#11 based smart card
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Fig. 2. Data encryption in SDMS
authentication or SSL based network authentication, but what is important is
to receive key safely for the decryption of DEK [12, 13]. In this paper, we only
consider disk data encryption which uses DEK, on the premise that DEK is
managed safely, though DEK is very important for the reliabile management of
data.
3.3 Sector Key Derivation Function DK Func
DK Func is a function to get sector encryption key RTEK in real time for the
encryption of sector.
RTEK = DK Func(DEK,SEED, i)
As we can see here, it outputs sector key for sector encryption from DEK,
SEED corresponding to the sector, and the sector index. Input data space must
be larger enough than output data space in the design of DK Func. For instance,
if DEK is 2048 bit, sector index is 32bit and SEED size is 128bit, then input data
space is 22048+32+128. Therefore, in case of using AES/XTS for sector encryption,
512 bit key is needed, and hence output space is 2512 which is smaller enough
than input space. DK Func must be implemented so as to satisfy one-wayness
and collision resistance as possible. So it is desirable to construct DK Func using
cryptographically safe hash function or hash chain.
3.4 Security Feature of SDMS
Firstly, SDMS solved temporal limitation problem of data encryption. SDMS
generates encryption key by generating random SEED newly each time when
writing request occurs. This makes it impossible to decrypt sector data written
later, although attacker succeeds to break RTEK of the sector.
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Secondly, SDMS solved spatial limitation problem of data encryption to a
certain extent. In SDMS, even though attacker succeeds to attack EA encrypted
certain sector, the only thing he knows is RTEK of that sector. He cant read
the contents of other sectors unless he knows DEK through the attack on EA
or DK Func. In this way, SDMS overcomes remarkably security weakness that
whole data of disk can be revealed by succeeding to attack a particular sector.
Thirdly, SDMS can control security performance flexibly according to the se-
qurity requirements. SDMS generates encryption key using disk encryption key
DEK and random SEED. DEK can be set big enough according to the security
requirement. For instance, if we set DEK as bigger than 1024 bit, then search
space will be increased more than 21024 when attacker attacks DKFunc to know
DEK. The size of SEED (SIZE(SDMS UNIT SEED) ) which is used to generate
sector key for sector encryption can also be set big enough according to the secu-
rity requirement of system and there is no restriction that SDMS UNIT SEED
must be arranged to each sector. Configuring system to generate sector key by
arranging one SDMS UNIT SEED to several sectors, we can coordinate balance
between security performance and operation cost reasonably.
4 Analysis Result
4.1 Cost of Brute Force Search
Attacker must attack encrypted sector data unless he knows user authentication
information or decrypted DEK by evil code. If sector keys that encrypted sector
data have no statistical characteristics and there is no information or algorithm
helpful to estimate sector key, brute force search will be appropriate method. In
case using AES/XTS/256 for sector encryption, the amount of computation will
be equal to WAES/XTS/256 × 2512. Here, AES/XTS encryption is expressed as
follows [16].
Ci = Ek1(Pi XOR (Ek2(n)× ai)) XOR (Ek2(n)× ai)
Here, × is multiplication operator in modulo GF (2) = x128 + x7 + x2 + 1,
K1 is key of symmetric key encryption algorithm (E), K2 is secondary key, i is
block index in encryption unit (sector), n is address of encryption unit (sector)
and is base of GF (Galois Field).
Attacker also can decrypt whole data of disk if he knows DEK. Therefore,
attacker may try to attack DEK and then to decrypt sector data using it. To
attack DEK, he must attack DK Func which derives sector key. He can find
necessary items in 2SIZE(DEK) space because he knows SEED and sector index
which are the inputs of DK Func. For instance, if SIZE(DEK)=2048, attacker
must search 22048 space. In case AES/XTS/256 is selected as EA, 256bit key
for XTS operation and 256bit key for final AES block encryption are needed,
and thus totally needed key is 512bit. Therefore, attacker can find candidates
outputting same RTEK if he calculate DK Func for about 2512 DEK candidates
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with computation WDK Func× 2512. There exists about 22048−512 candidates in
this case.
Now consider the case decoding an other sector using this candidate. Assum-
ing sector index is 32bit, the possibility of successful decryption of next sector
is very small.
1/22048−512+32+SIZE(SDMS UNIT SEED) =
2−(2048−512+32+SIZE(SDMS UNIT SEED))
That is because we use sector index and SEED when we calculate RTEK
for other sector. To get correct DEK from 22048−512 DEK candidates in 22048
space is very difficult, though it would be possible to get sector key by attacking
particular sector.
4.2 PRNG and Security Performance
Security problem in case using the result of PRNG as key directly for sector
encryption was considered in section 2. SDMS uses the output of PRNG as
input of DK Func for getting sector key and stores output of PRNG on disk
without changing. To attack disk data encrypted using SDMS needs not attack
PRNG. Random data generated by PRNG
– solves temporal limitation of disk encryption by changing sector key each
time it writes data,
– solves spatial limitation of disk encryption by setting sector key of each sector
differently,
– makes it more difficult to attack DK Func.
That is, performance and quality of PRNG in SDMS have no big relevance
with security performance of system.
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